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INDUSTRIAL SELF-REGULATION AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Harper W. Boyd, Jr.* and Henry Claycamp**,
responsibility of business organizations to society has recently
been the subject of increasing attention. Even though most
American corporations have become substantially more enlightened
about their responsibilities to the consumer, the feeling abounds in
certain quarters that business performance in this respect is not always adequate-particularly with regard to protecting the consumer's health and safety. Current inquiries by the federal government
into the safety of automobiles, cigarettes, and pharmaceuticals, for
example, indicate that some influential persons believe that more
governmental intervention on behalf of consumers is necessary. In
the past, expanded governmental control has frequently resulted
from the failure of private business to provide the kind of leadership
that would have obviated federal intervention.
Historically, businessmen have argued that competition is the
best pr~tector of the consumer's interests. This assumption implies
that the market place offers sufficient alternatives and that the consumer knows how to select those products and services which best
meet his needs. Nevertheless, governmental and business leaders
have demonstrated a considerable amount of agreement with respect
to the need of the consumer for assistance in improving his buying
skills. Over the years, the number of business and governmental organizations designed to aid the American consumer has risen sharply;
such organizations include, among others, better business bureaus,
trade associations, product testing laboratories, consumer advisory
councils, and state consumer fraud bureaus.
It is one thing to help the consumer make "better buys" in an
economic sense, but it is quite another to help him safeguard his
own life as well as the lives of others. Obviously the consequences in
these two situations are very different. Typically, whenever threats
to the consumer's health and safety have become obtrusively apparent, the federal and state governments-in one way or another and
. with varying degrees of efficiency-have taken action. Responsibility
for protecting consumers has devolved upon a large number of fed-
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era! agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission, the Food and
Drug Administration, the United States Department of Agriculture,
the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Federal Aviation
Agency.
As the affluence of the American society grows, a concern
about such matters as health, education, and welfare has also
become more apparent. Some concern derives from technological
breakthroughs which require control, · such as the development of
aircraft for mass transportation. In other cases, increased recognition
of serious threats to public health and safety has led various groups
of aroused citizens to advocate governmental control. Today, growing numbers of individuals and organizations believe that the consumer's health and safety are not being adequately protected in at
least two areas-cigarettes and automobiles. Thus, the following discussion is directed to the vital issue of whether these two industries
can voluntarily advance consumers' interests through the imposition
of adequate safety and health standards, or whether widened federal
intercession is essential.

I.

CIGARETIES

Recent studies have left little doubt in the minds of most physicians and scientists that cigarette smoking has harmful effects on
consumers' health and shortens their life span. It seems to be generally agreed that cigarette smoking is the principal cause of the increased incidence of lung cancer. This conclusion is particularly
significant in light of the estimate of the United States Public Health
Service that nearly eighty per cent of all men in the United States
have a history of tobacco use and that the incidence of use among
women has been steadily climbing.
In a study of 187,783 men between the ages of fifty and sixtynine, it was discovered that the death rate from all causes among
men who had a history of regular cigarette smoking was 1.68 times
higher than among men who had no such history.1 Furthermore, this
study indicated that the death rates were closely related to the number of cigarettes consumed daily. 2 The study also showed that the
relative rate of death from lung cancer among cigarette smokers was
over ten times greater than among nonsmokers.3 Currently there are
1. Hammond &: Hom, Smoking and Death Rates-Report on Forty-Four Months
of Follow-Up of 187,783 Men, 166 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1159, 1172 (1958).
2. Id. at 1161.
3. Id. at 1298.
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approximately forty thousand deaths annually from lung cancer;
this figure represents an increase of several hundred per cent since
the mid-1930's. Lung cancer now causes about six per cent of the
deaths among men in their late fifties and early sixties. Cigarette
smoking has also been linked to cancer of the mouth, throat, and
male bladder and to heart disease.4
A. The Effect of Cultural Attitudes
Clearly, the best protection against the harmful effects of cigarettes is to stop smoking them, but such a solution is rendered extremely difficult by the apparent failure of many people to perceive
a significant menace to health in smoking. For example, according
to a recent American Cancer Society survey only about, one person
in five believes that there is a correlation between lung cancer and
cigarette smoking. This rather startling state of affairs could well be
the result of selective perception. People believe what they want to
believe; if a "message" is unpleasant or threatening, in many cases
the mind refuses to receive it. The "cancer scare" has existed since
the early 1950's, and yet a decrease in the per capita consumption of
cigarettes has occurred only in 1953 and 1954. Certainly the increase
in consumption since 1954 can be attributed in 'considerable part to
filters, which help smokers rationalize their habit.
Any movement to reduce cigarette consumption must contend
with the satisfaction which smoking brings to some deep-seated human needs. Cultural forces override the obvious , disadyantages of
smoking-cost, dirtiness, and unhealthiness. According to some
psychologists, cigarette smoking signifies energy and drive, and many
people regard cigarette breaks as a reward for hard work. In a recent
study, it was determined that people smoke because: (1) it is a personal ritual-one which gives a sense of well-being and security;
(2) it provides a variety of sensuous pleasures; (3) it symbolizes virility, maturity, poise, and sophistication; and (4) it facilitates social
intercourse. 5
Most people who smoke want to continue to do so and will
rationalize the habit in some manner. Thus, success in reducing
the consumption of tobacco probably lies less with increasing indi4. See ADVISORY COMM. TO nm SURGEON GENERAL OF nm PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE,
REPORT ON SMOKING AND HEALTH (Pub. No. 1103, 1964).
5. See Cigarettes, Their Role and Function (1952) (report for the Chicago Tribune
by Social Research, Inc., Chicago, Ill.).
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vidual understanding of the "threat" than with reducing the cultural and social forces which sanction and encourage the use of
cigarettes as desirable symbols. This approach to the problem will
be exceedingly difficult and will take a long time, since cultural
attitudes are not easily changed.

B. Vested Interest Groups
A number of powerful and vitally interested parties are involved
with the cigarette industry, and this complicates the discovery of
a solution to the problem. In addition to consumers, the interested
parties include the cigarette industry itself, the federal government,
the national and local advertising media, advertising agencies, tobacco growers, state governments, and the American Medical Association.
The tobacco industry is primarily made up of large companies
which, in the aggregate, employ over sixty thousand workers and
have annual sales in excess of eight billion dollars. Although the
tobacco companies have long been aware of the threat to their industry, they have done little to diversify, and their major sales and
profits come almost entirely from the production and sale of cigarettes. They have primarily relied upon the introduction of new
brands (an expensive undertaking) and advertising to counteract
all negative influences on smokers. Therefore they remain highly
vulnerable to any change which would reduce their cigarette sales.
The federal government has the responsibility to protect the
health and welfare of all citizens. To date, a variety of governmental
units have interested themselves in the cigarette problem, including
the Federal Trade Commission, the Surgeon General's Office, the
Food and Drug Administration, and the Congress of the United
States. Although these groups are aware of the dangers associated
with cigarettes and the increasing incidence of smoking, little effective action has been taken. Almost two years have elapsed since the
Surgeon General's report linked cigarette smoking to health problems, and little has happened to suggest that a "solution" is under
way. About the only notable action in this regard has been the
requirement that every pack, box, and carton of cigarettes sold in
this country after January I, 1966, must carry a warning stating that
cigarette smoking may be hazardous to health. 6 However, in the
6. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 79 Stat. 282 (1965).
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same law that provided for the cautionary label, the Federal Trade
Commission was specifically barred from requiring health warnings
in cigarette advertising. Surely, when one ]?ranch of the federal
government enacts legislation to prevent action by another branch
with respect to the solution of a severe national problem, it would
seem clear that a fear exists in at least some government circles
that the cure may be worse than the disease-especially when an
effective cure would alienate certain powerful vested interest groups.
State and federal health agencies, as well as certain health associations, have issued educational material in one form or another in
an attempt to change smoking habits and especially to prevent adolescents from starting to smoke. However, it is doubtful that any
of these organizations seriously believes that its efforts can do much
to alter the present state of affairs.
The activity of the local and national advertising media leaves
little doubt as to their stand on this matter. As far back as 1962,
LeRoy Collins, then president of the National Association of Broadcasters, publicly stated that radio and television codes should provide unbiased leadership and that, in effect, the industry could not
ignore the cigarette problem.7 Many people in the broadcasting industry tried to minimize Collins' statements, and they publicly
assured tobacco sponsors that they were eager to continue accepting
cigarette advertising accounts. Perhaps this attitude is not so surprising in view of the tobacco industry's annual expenditure of.
approximately two hundred million dollars for advertising. Dr.
Eugene H. Guthrie, chief of the Division of Chronic Diseases of
the American Public Health Association, recently urged the media
to reconsider Collins' suggestions and noted that "despite the pretty
words in the broadcasting code, I see no real change in broadcasting
practices." 8
Advertising agencies have long been concerned with the cigarette problem because the tobacco industry represents one of their
most important sources of income. Agency personnel have been reasonably successful in accelerating the demand for cigarettes. In so
doing, they have successfully equated cigarettes with virility, maturity, sex, and social status. It appears that no agency has ever refused
to accept any major tobacco account on the ground that the agency's
7. Address by LeRoy Collins, Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters Conference, in Portland,
Oregon, Nov. 1962.
8. Address by Dr. Eugene H. Guthrie, The American Public Health Ass'n, Oct.
1965.
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efforts would increase the demand for a product which has potentially dangerous consequences for its users.
Farmers who grow tobacco constitute another interested group.
Some farmers have benefited, at least in part, from the Government's
tobacco price support program, which in the early 1960's was pro•
viding an annual subsidy of nearly fifty million dollars. No evidence suggests that farmers have given up the production of this
"drug" en masse.
C. Alternative Solutions
Given the dynamics of consumer behavior and the behavior of
manufacturers and governmental bodies, what does effective selfregulation for the enhancement of consumer welfare imply in the
case of cigarettes? Two courses of action seem possible: (1) production of tobaccos which are not detrimental to health; or (2) reduction or cessation of the production of cigarettes. Although efforts
are being made to put the first course of action into operation, there
is little evidence that positive results will be obtained.9
Attempts to restrict production or to reduce consumption are
also fraught with problems. It is inconceivable that cigar~tte producers will voluntarily support such a program, since that would be
tantamount to corporate suicide. However, the cigarette industry
has established an advertising code office headed by Robert B.
Meyner, former governor of New Jersey. One of the primary goals
of this office is to formulate guidelines regarding advertising con•
tent which appeals to persons under nventy-one years of age.
Doubt has been expressed in some quarters that the advertising
code can be effective. Certainly, the code does not strike at the heart
of the problem, since it appears that the ultimate objective should
be to convince people to stop smoking. Thus, remedial action must
center on attempts to minimize the psychological and social values
of cigarettes. A boycotting of cigarette advertising by national and
local media and the harnessing of the resources of both the media
and advertising agencies to develop and implement educational
campaigns designed to inform the public of the dangers of smoking
probably would be the most effective action which could be taken
by the business community. In light of the unsuccessful experience
with the Volstead Act, extreme action, such as the suppression of
9. No Substitute in Sight, Bus. Week, Jan. 18, 1964, p. 52.
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cigarette companies through the classification of cigarettes as a harmful drug, very likely would end up being more harmful to society
than the hazards associated with smoking.
The failure of the federal government to move decisively with
regard to the health problem resulting from smoking cigarettes very
well may have encouraged the tobacco industry and advertising media to adopt a somewhat complacent attitude. Similarly, the consumer does not seem to be taking the niatter very seriously, as indicated by the fact that in 1965 cigarette consumption increased 3.5
per cent despite anti-smoking propaganda, increased state taxes, and
"innocuous" advertising. 10
It seems clear that little has happened to promote optimism
about the development of a well-conceived program dealing with
the cigarette problem. The cigarette industry has done little selfregulation, and governmental action has dragged. In the meantime,
great quantities of a supposedly lethal product are being consumed.
II.

AUTOMOBILES

Automobile accidents account for about fifty thousand deaths
per year. In fact, such accidents constitute the fourth leading cause
of death in the United States, and for people between the ages of
five and thirty the automobile is the leading cause of death. In addition, several million persons sustain injuries each year from automobile mishaps. Nearly one out of every three persons admitted to
hospitals is there because of a car accident, and one out of every
four partial or complete paralysis cases caused by injury is due to
the automobile.
In recent years, car accidents have cost the public tens of billions
of dollars in property damage, lost wages, medical expense, and
insurance premiums. Moreover, this large burden does not include
such costs as those involving the police, the courts, emergency standby facilities, driver licensing, and automobile safety inspection.
These add more billions of dollars to the annual cost.
The traditional attitude has been that although automobile
accidents were recognized as a function of the environment in which
the car operated (that is, the roads, the driver, and the automobile),
it was felt that only the driver could be "controlled" to any great
extent. Thus, past efforts to meet the problem have relied mainly
IO. See Maxwell, Winstons Press Pall Malls for Lead, Printers' Ink, bee. 10, 1965.
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on driver education. Without gainsaying the importance of drivers
in the prevention of accidents, the belief has been growing that the
vehicles themselves can be improved in ways which will significantly
reduce deaths and accidents.
A.

Misplaced Emphasis by Both Designers and Consumers

Although the problems of automobile safety and cigarettes are
similar in a few respects, they involve basically different considerations. Both products have a profound "hold" on consumers, albeit
for different reasons. Automobiles are certainly a highly visible status symbol, and it is felt by some people that a car tells a lot about
the owner, including his adventuresomeness, virility, wealth, and social class. Rarely is an automobile thought of as simply a vehicle for
transportation. Certainly the several million people who flocked to
the showrooms during the first few days after the introduction of
the Mus tang were not just interested in a machine to convey them
from one point to another.
,.,
As a consequence of the consumer's conception of the role of a
car, the stylist has emerged as perhaps the most important man in
the automobile industry. Manufacturers now cater to the public by
offering, in the aggregate, hundreds of body styles and thousands of
trim combinations. Annual style changes are surrounded by secrecy
and are introduced with fanfare which costs tens of millions of
dollars. It is quite clear that the large sums of money spent to create
and introduce styling reduce the funds which might othenvise be
devoted to engineering and safety.
The relative emphasis placed on style and safety features undoubtedly reflects the fact that the effect on consumer demand is unquestionable, whereas there is little evidence to suggest that consumers make brand choices on the basis of safety. For example, consider
the elimination of door posts in many models and the continuation
of fins for several years after reports that they contributed to serious
accidents. The failure of consumers to give more weight to safety
features when purchasing automobiles is due to many factors.
As previously noted, most Americans place the blame for accidents on the driver; seldom has anyone blamed the car, an inanimate object. Similarly, all safety campaigns are addressed to
the driver, on the theory that he is the only one who can prevent
an accident. In fact, accidents are recorded on the basis of driver
fault, since most traffic laws have been set forth in a way which, if
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followed, would prevent accidents. If an accident occurs, a traffic
regulation must have been violated. Such accidents are investigated
almost exclusively by the police and by insurance companies. This
process reinforces the law enforcement aspects of such inquiries, and
only rarely is a question raised about the contribution of the car's
design to the accident.
No national or state body that systematically investigates accidents has ever focused upon the design of the cars involved. The
National Safety Council, which is primarily responsible for compiling and reporting traffic accident statistics, does not compile data
dealing with the car makes and models involved in accidents or
report on the effect of automobile design and performance on accident results. It was not until the early 1950's that vehicle design
was evaluated in this connection, and then the study was made by
a university under a grant from the federal government.11

B. Automotive Design Ignored by Safety Organizations
In his chapter entitled "The Traffic Safety Establishment,"
Ralph Nader discusses the bewildering array of organizations involved in automobile safety.12 The number of these organizations
and their interrelationships are substantial, which is to be expected
in view of the great complexity of the passenger-car system. The system includes the automobile industry, the insurance industry, the
federal government, state and local governments, and a variety of
associations.13
Nader points out that safety has been largely delegated to a number of non-governmental organizations which are subsidized heavily
by the automobile and insurance industries. These groups include:
I. The National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances, which periodically publishes a guide for state motor vehicle laws. The guide does not specify any features of vehicle design
which have been related to injuries sustained from accidents. In
dealing with vehicular inspection, it provides a check list which,
if followed, will restore the inspected car to its original condition.
2. The Automobile Safety Foundation, which awards grants
11. The research was done at Cornell University. The initial grant of $54,000 was
made in 1953.
12. See NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1965).
13. Of course, advertising media and related industries are also mixed in the pattern in one way or another, but they , are not discussed here in the interest of ·
conserving space.

1248

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 64:1239

to a variety of groups (such as the American Bar Association, the
International Association of Chiefs of Police, the National Safety
Council, and the American Municipal Association) for support of
traffic safety programs.
3. The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, which operates
much like the Automobile Safety Foundation.
4. The National Safety Council, which is heavily involved with
safety programs. This organization does little or no research directed
at accident prevention and has not made any statements about auto•
mobile designs.
5. The President's Committee for Traffic Safety, which is sup•
ported by private industry. The committee's work is largely that of
distributing safety information materials to other organizations.
In addition to the above organizations, the American Automobile Association, while a powerful force at both the national and
local level, has almost never become involved in a critical evaluation
of automobile designs. Similarly, insurance companies have been
reluctant to make open attacks on automobile designs, although
Liberty Mutual did design several cars which incorporated a substantial number of tested safety features. This program was recently
terminated.
The foregoing discussion is a great oversimplification of the
problems associated with automobile safety, but it does indicate
that no single agency has any real responsibility (or enforcement
power) for setting safety standards related to vehicular design. It
also indicates the preoccupation with driver performance. N evertheless, what little research has been done in relating car design to
accidents shows clearly that cars can be built which will drastically
reduce injuries received under certain conditions. Without too
much effort, most recommendations regarding visibility, glare, and
penetrating steering wheel assemblies could be implemented.
C. Problems Inherent in Self-Regulation by the Automobile
Industry
The problem of automobile safety is more vast and complex
than cigarette smoking because: (1) more parties are involved;
(2) the solution is only a matter of degree (better safety design
as opposed to elimination of cigarette smoking); and (3) the individual driver automatically involves other people (pedestrians,
passengers, and other motorists) and their property in his actions.
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These diverse ramifications affect the availab~e solutions to the
problem.
One solution is to permit the automobile companies to respond
to the problem on an individual basis and take whatever action
they deem best. It seems evident, however, that, until consumers
perceive safety features as an important consideration in the purchase of a specific make, hope for the achievement of significant
results through action by individual firms must ·remain small. Incorporation of safety features as standard equipment results, for the
most part, in higher costs. If consumers do not consider these features important, the company using them is placed at a competitive
disadvantage. Recognizing this, automobile manufacturers, have
made many safety features optional equipment, but this approach
does not meet head-on the problem of conflicts between style and
safety. As long as relevant safety standards are not made obligatory
for the entire industry, individual manufacturers are not likely to
resolve such conflicts in favor of increased safety.
Individual manufacturers, however; can increase the importance
of the safety appeal. Undoubtedly, all purchasers of automobiles
possess at least a latent desire for safety. The literature on mass
communications provides some evidence that repeated appeals to
latent desires can increase their saliency and make them important
variables in the decisio:I?- process.14 If a company were to embark on
such a campaign, it would of course have to devote_ a significant
amount of its promotion expenditures to safety appeals in order
to prove that the need for safety was being met by its products.
Some of the major manufacturers apparently have made a start
in this direction. For example, the Ford Motor Company recently
undertook a significant promotion campaign in which the major
theme was safety.115 Although this undertaking represented only a
small part of the company's promotional expenditures, and the ma14. See HOVLAND, JANIS & KELLEY, COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION (1953). If one
wants to increase the saliency of the desire for safety, appeals must be used which
allude to the physical danger which might occur as a result of failure to take action
which would increase safety. See id., ch. 3, for a summary of the literature relating
to this communication situation and a discussion of the conditions under which such
communication can be effective.
15. Announcement of the promotion was reported in The Wall Street Journal,
Dec. 27, 1965, p. 5, col. 4. The news story reported that the promotion would include
a twelve-page insertion in Time Magazine and sixteen-page supplements in twentyfive Sunday newspapers. Included in the story was an announcement by the president
of the University of Michigan that an institute to study and report on safety aspects
of vehicles, drivers, roads, and traffic would be established at Ann Arbor with a
$10 million grant from the four major automobile manufacturers.
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jority of the advertising space was devoted to aspects of safety other
than automobile design, considerable attention was given to the
new safety features which are standard equipment on 1966 products
of the Ford Motor Company. As might be expected, most of these
features-seat belts, emergency flashers, and padded visors-are
easily demonstrated to and recognized by the consumer. N evertheless, if such promotions were carried out on a broad scale by the
entire industry, it is possible that safety could become a more important dimension of competition, and the consumer would benefit.
A more pervasive solution would be for the industry to delegate
complete responsibility for specifying and enforcing design standards to an autonomous agency. The agency could be either a new
-organization specifically established for this task or an existing but
somewhat inactive body, such as the Automotive Safety Foundation,
which could be revitalized. The functions of such a unit would include the collection and analysis of reports on accidents, research
on the effect of alternative designs on safety under a variety of
conditions, performance of the engineering required to translate the
research results into product specifications, and control over the
products manufactured by the automobile industry.
Such an agency would have to be an organization of considerable size and power. The need for highly qualified engineers
and researchers (who would come from a variety of disciplines,
including medicine and related areas) and the high cost of laboratory equipment would certainly indicate that such a center would
be expensive to set up as well as to maintain. Some rough idea of
possible costs can be obtained by looking at the funds spent by the
federal government in its aviation safety work. In recent years, the
annual expenditure has varied between approximately thirty-five
and sixty million dollars. Even though airplanes are far more complicated than automobiles, there is no reason to believe that a passenger-car safety center would cost less to operate than the aviation
safety program. Indeed, an automotive safety center might be substantially more expensive because of the difficulties of monitoring
car accidents, working with engineers and designers from the various
companies, and making certain that the minimum standards were
effectively implemented in new cars. However, since the annual
profits of the automobile manufacturers run into many hundreds of
millions of dollars, the cost of such a center should not be regarded
as the critical issue. It is also likely that the expense would eventually
be passed on to the consumer.
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A more serious question regarding the feasibility of such a center concerns its investigative powers and the legal consequences of
its findings. Since automobile accidents involve local law enforcement authorities, local courts, and insurance companies, the question of how such a center could obtain cooperation arises. Would
such persons permit· their work to be scrutinized closely by an outsider? Some of the problems could undoubtedly be overcome by
delegating the responsibility for data collection to a prestigious
institution such as a university.
A related problem would arise from investigations that resulted
in the center requiring a change iIJ. standards for one of the automobile manufacturers. It could be reasoned that the imposition of
such a requirement was tantamount to a finding that the manufacturer had been guilty of faulty design. Moreover, if such an investigation were instituted as a result of a series of accidents, it is likely
that representatives of the center could be forced to testify as expert
witnesses regarding the institution's conclusions as to design safety.
The consequences of such disclosures could be devastating to the
industry.
The specter of collusion would also undoubtedly be raised if
an effective safety center were established. It is possible that effective safety standards, when applied, would raise the cost of manufacturing automobiles, and prices would be increased to _cover both
increased costs and a profit on the safety features. Increased car
prices would raise a hue and cry from the Government as well as
from consumers. The car is not only a vital part of life for most
Americans, but it is also one of the most expensive possessions of
a consumer. Automobile manufacturers would be accused of using
safety as a rationale for price escalation. Thus, it is likely that the
industry would be forced to submit to costly harassment by the
Government.
Another aspect of the "collusion" problem has to do with the
impact of safety standards on design. It is possible that the current
variability of styles and designs would be substantially reduced,
resulting in increased similarity among makes and models. This
effect would be quite obvious and would undoubtedly lead some
people to conclude that a conspiracy was underway to reduce design
costs and the number of real alternatives available to the consumer.
The oligopolistic nature of the car industry would intensify this
suspicion.
Finally, we are faced with the problem of who would control
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such a center. Because of the power which would be required
for an effective safety center, it would need to be controlled in an
unbiased way, but the size and scope of the automobile industry
would make it hard to find a "disinterested" board of directors. In
addition, would the Government tolerate such power in the hands
of a single unit without governmental monitoring? On the other
hand, would the automobile companies voluntarily delegate such a
substantial part of their decision making to an outside agency over
which they had no control? Given the expenses involved in such
self-regulation and the inherent dangers of provoking governmental
interference, this delegation is not likely to occur except in response
to an imminent threat of governmental regulation.

D.

The Only Effective Solution-Governmental Regulation of
Sa/ety Standards

It thus appears unlikely that the industry can or will attempt
self-regulation to any substantial extent. Because of this and the
obvious problems of individual state regulation, it can be argued
that if safety design standards are to be established and regulation
undertaken, such action must be taken by the federal government.
The Government has a successful prototype in the Federal Aviation
Agency, which promulgates and enforces safety regulations applying
to all civilian aircraft. The FAA inspects and licenses all such aircraft, and also licenses pilots and aviation mechanics. In addition,
the Civil Aeronautics Board investigates all airplane accidents. If
an investigation reveals that a carrier or airplane manufacturer was
negligent in following prescribed rules or was guilty of substandard
workmanship which was a causal factor in the accident, then the..
party or parties involved can be sued for damages.
Not all governmental agencies have been as successful as the
FAA and the CAB. For example, throughout its history the Food and
Drug Administration has suffered from the low pay and prestige
accorded many of its Bureau of Medicine positions, pressures from
politicians acting on incomplete scientific evidence, and the problems of cooperating with scientists employed by the pharmaceutical industry. The large amount of work thrown on the FDA
by the 1962 drug reform legislation has made it difficult for the
· Agency to carry out its basic responsibilities.16 Thus, the effi16. For a report on the problems facing the FDA's medical director, see Spivak,
Regulating Drugs, The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 28, 1965, p. 8, col. 4.
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ciency of a governmental agency is not by any means automatic.
Unless Congress were to set up an agency with the proper authority
and funds, the results would probably not be impressive. Apparently
the Johnson administration has reasoned along these lines; according to recent statements in the press, the President may soon propose
to Congress a five;year automobile safety program which will cost
about five hundred million dollars. It is reported that the bill would
empower the Secretary of Commerce to fix minimum safety requirements for all vehicles sold in the United States. Thus, the Administration appears to be taking a stronger stand on the safety issue than
that proposed by Senator Ribicoff in the National Highway Safety
Bill. The major provisions in Senator Ribicoff's bill deal with the
consolidation of safety programs, driver education, and uniform
inspection to eliminate defective automobiles. Whether either bill
would meet the design safety problem sufficiently is not known.

III.

SUMMARY

Considerable evidence indicates that the consumer's health and
safety are not adequately protected with respect to cigarettes and
automobiles. Recent studies leave little doubt that cigarette smoking shortens the life span of human beings and that automobile
accidents kill about fifty thousand persons each year and injure several million others. The cost to society of damage done by cigarettes
and automobiles runs into many billions of dollars annually.
Many powerful vested interest groups are involved with the
cigarette problem. To date, neither they nor the federal government
have indicated an intention of taking any serious action to effect a
solution. In the case of automobile safety, a substantial number of
organizations are involved, and safety has been delegated to nongovernmental groups heavily subsidized by the automobile and insurance industries. No single agency has any real responsibility for
setting safety standards related to vehicle design.
Industrial self-regulation is not likely to emerge in the case of
cigarettes. Tobacco companies are not going to commit corporate
suicide, and there is no indication that cigarette promotions are
being refused by the advertising media. On the other hand, the
Government has not offered any effective programs to reduce or
eliminate the hazard. The problem of automobile safety design is
more complex than that of cigarettes. Because th~ incorporation of
safety features is likely to increase costs and because the consumer
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does not consider safety a dominant factor in selecting an automobile, self-regulation on an individual company basis is not likely
to occur. An autonomous agency with delegated responsibility for
specifying design standards is also probably not feasible because of
legal, control, and cost considerations. Thus, governmental regulation patterned after that provided by the Federal Aviation Agency
would seem to be the most effective solution.
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